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Like many participants in this stimulating symposium, I am in agreement with
several of Sionaidh Douglas-Scott’s contentions. But like some others, I am less
persuaded by one of her conclusions: namely, that a treaty revision based on
Article 48 TEU would suffice to codify an independent Scotland’s membership in
the EU. While admittedly unprecedented, such a situation could not in itself warrant
a complete disregard of EU membership rules, eg Article 49 TEU. As part of ‘the
particular constitution and rules of the EU’, they should instead be applied, given
their specific function in the treaties (1), albeit in a ‘pragmatic and purposive fashion’
in consideration of the existing and future ties between Scotland and the EU (2).
While taking such a position, I intend to stay away, insofar as this is possible, from
the moral and political discussion on independence, and to restrict myself to a (EU)
legal argument.
(1) In two ways, Article 49 TEU is a lex specialis. It establishes the specific EU
procedure for admitting a new state into the Union, precluding that ‘standard rules of
international law govern the process’. Like Article 48 TEU and Article 50 TEU, Article
49 TEU belongs to the constitutional charter of the Union. Article 49 TEU is also a
lex specialis relative to other EU provisions. Addressed to ‘[A]ny European state
[that wishes] to become a member of the Union’, irrespective of whether the aspirant
comes from within or outside, its exclusive function in the system of the treaties is
to alter the state composition of the EU by admitting a new member, and to set out
‘the conditions of admission and adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is
founded, which such admission entails’. The specificity of Article 49 TEU is typified
by the particular role that EU institutions play in the process.
But altering the state configuration of the Union is not only subject to compliance
with the procedural requirements of Article 49 TEU, it also entails observance of
specific substantive conditions. In addition to respecting and promoting the values
of Article 2 TEU, the aspirant is expected to fulfil the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’,
one of which is to demonstrate its ability, as a state, ‘to take on the obligations of
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary
union’. Undoubtedly, Scotland as an independent state would meet most such
conditions. Yet, apart from the thorny question compatibility of its post-independence
monetary arrangement with the EMU, the fact that its devolved administrative and
judicial institutions have been involved in the application of EU law for more than
40 years would not in itself guarantee that its structures, as a state, would be in
a position to implement the whole acquis from the day of independence. Specific
transitional arrangements could thus have to be agreed. To be sure, Iceland, which
has perhaps been the most EU-integrated of candidates, has been subject to the
standard admission rules.
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Moreover, the decision to increase the number of member states in the Union
is contingent upon the so-called ‘absorption capacity’ or ‘integration capacity of
the Union’ (eg Commission’s report). This entails considering whether enlarged
membership may affect the EU decision-making process, and its capacity to fulfil
and finance its policy objectives. This consideration has become increasingly
significant in the context of the on-going enlargement, and it is unlikely to be entirely
uncared for in the case of an ‘internal enlargement’, particularly given that Scotland’s
independence would set a precedent for other potential ‘internal’ candidates for
membership.
As it has been recalled by several participants, the procedure of Article 48 TEU,
which differs from that of Article 49 TEU, including possibly in the ratification
phase, has a distinct purpose, namely to allow existing Member States to amend
the founding treaties. Arguably, it is not purported to include new parties to the
existing treaties, or to introduce the necessary legal changes to EU primary and
secondary law, or transitional arrangements for making that inclusion possible.
As made clear time and again by the European Court of Justice, the choice of the
appropriate legal basis has constitutional significance and must rest on objective
factors which are amenable to judicial review, such as, in particular, the aim and the
content of the measure. Hence, the choice of the adequate avenue for Scotland’s
membership should not be left to political and practical expediency. To be sure, it
would not be in the interest of the Union, and of the aspirant state concerned, that a
perception develops whereby EU constitutional rules to acquire state membership
are circumvented, particularly when they have become so entrenched in relation to
other candidates.
(2) While EU membership rules should therefore be followed, they should be so in
a ‘pragmatic and purposive’ fashion, to use Sionaidh Douglas-Scott’s expression,
notably to address the complex implications of Scotland’s independence and
considering her existing ties with, and aspirations in relation to the EU.
As she rightly points, the European integration process ‘goes beyond the traditional
state-based concerns of international law’. While Van Gend provides support for
the direct link between EU law and individuals, the ‘peoples’ dimension of the
European integration process, and incidentally of membership, is entrenched in
the EU treaties themselves. Thus, the treaties’ preambles still refers to the EEC
based vision of ‘an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe (…)’ and to the
contracting parties’ ‘call(…) upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal
to join in their efforts’ (emphasis added) – a legal expression of Monet’s expression:
‘Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, nous unissons des hommes" (Jean Monnet’s
Discours, Washington, 30 avril 1952).  Other legal foundations tend to substantiate
the peoples’ facet of the EU, and of its possible bearing on the discussion at hand.
Thus Article 3(1) TEU stipulates that ‘the Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values
and the well-being of its peoples’.
Scots, as a people of Europe, have ‘join[ed] in [the] efforts’ for the last forty years, as
part of the United Kingdom. In particular, they are part and parcel of the EU citizenry,
integrated in its internal market and, to some extent, of its area of freedom, security
and justice. As such, they have already acquired elements of EU membership,
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which ought to be preserved, particularly in view of their claimed aspiration of full
membership. Similarly, the situation of EU citizens living in Scotland ought to be
considered.
Against that backdrop, and as advocated by several contributors, the EU and
its Member States would be under a duty to engage with Scotland, should the
referendum support independence. Article 3(1) TEU, mentioned above, read in
combination with Article 4(3) TEU (and Article 13(2) TEU) establishing the duty of
sincere cooperation, could provide a foundation for this.
Thus, it could be argued that the Scottish government be admitted to apply for
full membership immediately after a potential pro-independence vote on 18/9. In
response to this application, and based on a pragmatic reading of Article 49 notion
of ‘Any European state’, the Council could then respond by allowing the admission
procedure to start, if other eligibility conditions are deemed fulfilled. Such a dynamic
interpretation of the notion of ‘state’ has precedents in EU law, particularly with
respect to the negotiation and conclusion of association agreements. Negotiations
between Scotland, while in the process of formally acquiring statehood, and the
EU Member States could thus begin immediately to agree on the terms of its full
membership (including possible opt-outs).
In the not so unlikely scenario where the accession treaty would not be ratified by the
time of Scotland’s formal independence in 2016, additional measures would have to
be considered to cover the intermediate period, and avoid Scotland’s being cast into
‘a non-EU wilderness’. The chief purpose of what would be a mutual and multifarious
engagement, as alluded to in various contributions, would be to protect the integrity
of the rights that are part of the legal heritage of all individuals concerned, pending
accession: viz. EU rights of Scots in Scotland, of Scots in the rest of the EU, as well
as of EU citizens in Scotland.
‘Where there is a will…’
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